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Summary 
This paper assesses the impacts of decoupled government transfers on production decisions of a sample of 
Kansas farms. Our empirical analysis is based upon a reduced-form application of the dual model of 
investment under uncertainty developed by Sckokai (2005), which is extended to a consideration of 
irregularities in the capital stock adjustment cost function.  To do so we adopt the threshold regression 
methods proposed by Hansen (1999). The econometric results support the existence of three regimes 
characterised by different economic behaviour. Our analysis suggests that in a dynamic setting that allows 
for irregularities in the capital adjustment cost function, decoupled transfers can have a powerful influence 
on production decisions. The dynamics of the stock of capital cause this influence to grow over time. 
 
Key words: Investment, Decoupling, Threshold Behaviour 
JEL classification: Q12, Q18 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
With the proliferation of decoupled instruments over the last two decades as a key 
element in agricultural policy formulation in developed countries, several studies seek to 
assess the impacts of these instruments on farmers’ decisions. Published work in this area 
considers the three chief mechanisms through which policy measures can affect 
agricultural production.  
The first group contains papers studying the partially decoupled area payments 
introduced in the European Union (EU) by the 1992 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform, focusing on the static effects of policy under risk neutrality. In this scenario, 
policies will only impact on farmers’ economic decisions as long as they alter relative 
market prices. Papers within this group include Guyomard et al. (1996), Moro and 
Sckokai (1999) and Serra et al. (2005) and have generally used a theoretical framework 
approach that assumes perfect markets and risk neutral producers.  
Price-neutral policies can also influence production in a static framework with 
risk averse economic agents, by means of altering price or revenue uncertainty and 
exogenous income. A more recent avenue of research on decoupling has explicitly 
allowed for risk and risk preferences (Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Serra et al., 2006). This 
literature generally builds upon Sandmo’s (1971) seminal paper demonstrating that lump 
sum transfers, by means of altering farm household wealth, can affect individuals’ risk 
preferences and their economic decisions.  
More incipient is the literature considering the dynamic effects of policy. Farm 
output is a function of different inputs including the level of capital, which depends on 
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past decisions on investments. To the extent that lump sum transfers can alter investment 
demand, the effects of decoupled policies on production may play a more important role 
in a dynamic setting. The latter constitutes a third mechanism through which agricultural 
policy can affect economic decisions, i.e., through the dynamic investment response, 
which will have long-lasting impacts on production. Our paper will focus on assessing 
this dynamic response.  
As detailed in the literature, in a world with perfect capital markets, statically 
decoupled payments are not likely to influence a farm’s capital stock. However, 
decoupled payments may have the effect of stimulating farm investments in the presence 
of capital market imperfections such as financial constraints on borrowing, which will 
carry their output effects into future years. The literature on this topic has been sparse 
with Sckokai (2005) and Coyle (2005) being two notable exceptions. Following the 
modern theory on investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), which 
recognizes the importance of uncertainties related to future market conditions in the 
decision to invest, Sckokai (2005) not only assesses the dynamic investment effects, but 
also allows for risk preferences and some degree of uncertainty affecting production and 
investment decision choices. Our empirical application is based upon the framework 
proposed by Sckokai (2005). 
In line with the typical classical dynamic setting, the literature on the effects of 
decoupling on investment decisions has assumed convex investment costs that allow 
quasi-fixed inputs to adjust smoothly over time to their optimal level, where the shadow 
value of capital equals its marginal adjustment costs (Lucas, 1967; Rothschild, 1971). 
Irregularities in the adjustment cost function however, may prevent firms from adjusting 
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to changing market conditions. Following Abel and Eberly (1994) and Boetel et al. 
(2007), we extend the previous literature on decoupling by allowing for these 
irregularities by specifying threshold-type behaviour in investment demand. To do so, we 
adopt the threshold regression estimation procedures proposed by Hansen (1999). 
Hansen’s threshold estimation procedures are a relatively new technique within the 
investment literature and they have not been previously applied to assess the impacts of 
decoupling, which constitutes the main novelty of our analysis. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on assessing the impacts of the extensive reform 
that the US farm policy underwent in 1996. The reform was embodied in the 1996 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act and involved a reduction in 
the coupled element of income support. Price supports were cut and the negative effects 
of price changes on farmers’ incomes were compensated by production flexibility 
contract (PFC) payments that did not require the production of certain crops and were not 
linked to actual production or prices, and by a deficiency payment that guaranteed a 
minimum support price for program crops. Our objective is to determine the dynamic 
investment effects of PFC payments using farm-level data from the Kansas Farm 
Management Association dataset.  
 
 
2.  Adjustment cost irregularities in agriculture 
 
Typically, the adjustment cost function is assumed to be strictly convex with a value of 
zero at zero investment, which allows a smooth adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs to their 
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optimal level. The existence of irregularities (such as nonconvexities) leads to nonsmooth  
adjustment and is likely to prevent firms from continuously adapting to changing market 
conditions, leading to the asset fixity problem. Fixed costs of adjustment as well as 
irreversibility have been identified as the main reasons causing the asset fixity problem 
(Galbraith and Black, 1938; Johnson, 1958; Arrow, 1968; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Abel 
and Eberly, 1994). Fixed costs of adjustment such as managerial decision costs, fixed 
costs of placing orders, etc., are nonnegative costs that do not depend on the level of 
investment and that are incurred when investment is nonzero.  
Irreversibility occurs when capital goods cannot be sold at the same price as they 
were purchased. This is likely to occur when firms use specialized assets that complicate 
intersectoral and even intrasectoral adjustments. Recent research has focused on the 
relationship between irreversibility and uncertainty both at the theoretical and empirical 
levels (Pindyck, 1991; Abel and Eberly, 1994; Chavas, 1994; Chang and Stefanou, 1988; 
Oude Lansink and Stefanou, 1997; Pietola and Myers, 2000; Boetel et al., 2007). 
Asset fixity in agriculture has been widely documented in the literature and results 
are quite mixed. Early studies on the topic (Tweeten and Quance, 1969; Houck, 1977; 
Traill et al., 1978) essentially estimate irreversible supply and factor demand equations 
by splitting data into two portions, one corresponding to output price increases and the 
other to output price declines, and they fit different regressions to each portion. 
Irreversibility is assessed by testing whether the slopes of the two regressions differ. 
Results generally provide evidence in favor of asset fixity in US agriculture or in several 
of its subsectors. Validity of the testing is however conditional upon accurate 
classification of the data in order to represent the true underlying economic process.  
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Chambers and Vasavada (1983) test for asset fixity in US agriculture using the 
putty-clay hypothesis. All forms of fixity considered are statistically rejected.  By using 
investment dynamic dual models and testing the hypothesis that the capital adjustment 
rate is equal to minus one (and whose rejection is interpreted as evidence of 
irreversibility), Vasavada and Chambers (1986) and Howard and Shumway (1988) obtain 
evidences in favor of the quasi-fixity problem in US agriculture and in the US dairy 
sector, respectively.  
Nelson et al. (1989) test for asymmetries in investment in US agriculture by using 
a Markov chain model of transition between investment and disinvestment. They find 
some evidence supporting asymmetry, which is stronger in specialized assets. Specialized 
farm quasi-fixed assets such as farm real estate or agricultural machinery have little uses 
outside the agricultural sector and are thus more prone to display the asset fixity problem. 
Most of the empirical analyses on asset fixity in agriculture, including the papers 
cited above, have not explicitly modeled this problem. A few exceptions are Chang and 
Stefanou (1988), Oude Lansink and Stefanou (1997), Pietola and Myers (2000), and 
Boetel et al. (2007). Chang and Stefanou (1988) allow for asymmetric adjustment in the 
dynamic dual approach using an endogenous switching model and a tobit switching 
model to correct for selectivity bias. They find symmetry to be rejected for Pennsylvania 
dairy farms. Following Abel and Eberly (1994), Oude Lansink and Stefanou (1997) use a 
threshold model to characterize investment demand in the Dutch cash crop sector. In their 
model, however, observations on zero investments are not used and only the investment 
and disinvestment decisions are estimated by a Tobit procedure. Their results show that it 
is optimal for the producer neither to invest nor to disinvest for a range of shadow prices; 
 7
moreover, adjustment is found to be asymmetric, being faster in the contracting regime 
than in the expanding regime. Pietola and Myers (2000) use a stochastic dual model of 
investment under uncertainty that allows for asymmetry in investment response during 
capital expansion and contraction phases. However, the model does not postulate a 
threshold decision rule as proposed by Abel and Eberly (1994). Focusing on assessing 
structural adjustment in the Finnish hog sector, labour investment is found to be 
asymmetric. 
In the spirit of Abel and Eberly (1994), Boetel et al. (2007) address the issues of 
asymmetries in investment behaviour and the possible existence of a sluggish regime in 
the demand for quasi-fixed inputs, by adopting a relatively new threshold estimation 
procedure proposed by Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000). Their results suggest the relevance of 
allowing for investment rigidity when estimating supply and variable input demand in the 
US hog industry. Our empirical application follows Boetel et al. (2007) in that we also 
use Hansen’s (1996, 1999, 2000) threshold estimation procedures to allow for 
irregularities in capital adjustment costs. 
 
 
3. The Model and Estimation Methods 
 
The literature addressing agricultural investment decisions based on the duality theory 
developed by McLaren and Cooper (1980) and Epstein (1981) has generally imposed 
rather restrictive assumptions on risk and risk preferences. More recent developments 
have allowed for nonstatic price expectations and risk though assuming risk neutral 
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economic agents (see Luh and Stefanou, 1996; and Pietola and Myers, 2000). In a static 
expectations framework, Sckokai (2005) has allowed for risk and risk preferences. Our 
empirical analysis builds on the dynamic dual model of investment under uncertainty 
developed by Sckokai (2005) by considering irregularities in the capital stock adjustment 
cost function.  
Under the assumption that farmers are risk averse and take their decisions with 
the aim of maximizing the discounted utility over an infinite horizon, the value of the 
firm can be represented as (Sckokai, 2005): 
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where function u  is a farmer’s utility function which is assumed to depend on the 
expected farm’s wealth 0      A A p y wx ck S  and its variance 2 A , while r  is the 
interest rate, 
.
k  is the time derivative of the capital path, I  is the level of gross 
investments,   is the capital depreciation rate and k  are the units of capital stock. 
Concerning the specification of A, 0A  is a farm’s initial wealth, x  is the quantity used of 
a variable input that can be adjusted at no cost, ( , , )y f x k I  is a farm’s single output 
production function, p  is the market output price, which is assumed to be a random 
variable with mean p  and variance 2p , hence  2 2 A pf , w  is the variable input price, 
c  is the capital rental price and S  are decoupled payments. The Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation corresponding to the optimization program is: 
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where the subscript k denotes the first derivative of J. The first derivatives of this 
expression with respect to output and input prices will yield the investment demand, 
output supply and input demand equations 
.
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 The theoretical framework by Sckokai (2005) does not consider irregularities in 
the capital adjustment cost function. Abel and Eberly (1994) develop a theoretical 
framework based on an augmented adjustment cost function that allows for differences 
between purchase and resale asset prices, asymmetries in fixed capital adjustment costs, 
and a kink in the conventional adjustment cost function at its origin. Within this 
framework, capital investment is a non-decreasing function of the asset’s shadow price,  
kJ . However, it does follow a threshold-type behaviour characterised by a lower and an 
upper critical value of the shadow price. Optimal gross investment is expected to be 
positive (negative) for shadow prices above (below) the upper (lower) threshold. For 
shadow prices in the range comprised between the two thresholds, capital may not adjust 
(or may adjust more slowly) to exogenous shocks. 
 As shown by Boetel et al. (2007), Abel and Eberly’s (1994) threshold-type 
behaviour can be empirically estimated by following Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000) 
threshold estimation procedures. We apply these estimation methods to assess the 
dynamic investment effects of decoupled transfers. As noted above, the use of Hansen’s 
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threshold methods in assessing the impacts of decoupling constitutes the main novelty of 
our analysis.  
Boetel et al. (2007) only allow the slope coefficient on capital stock in the 
investment demand equation to switch among regimes, thus permitting adjustment speed 
to long run equilibrium to vary by regime. By further allowing for asymmetry in 
immediate short run responses, we extend their empirical implementation by also 
allowing the coefficient on the output price in the investment demand equation to vary 
across regimes. In order for output supply and variable input demand to reflect 
investment regimes, these equations are estimated conditional on the stock of capital as 
well as on investment levels.1 Contrary to Boetel et al. (2007), the system of first-order 
conditions is estimated simultaneously to avoid inefficiencies in the estimation process.   
As is well known, the empirical counterparts for the output supply and input 
demand equations can be derived by specifying a functional form for the value function 
J . However, the result is a nonlinear system of equations that seriously complicates the 
computational implementation of threshold regression methods. These methods generally 
assume that while a variable adjusts differently (but nonlinearly) across regimes, there is 
a linear adjustment within each regime. We thus estimate a reduced-form of the equations 
of the system where the optimal output supply and input demand equations are expressed 
as: 
 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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where all β’s are vectors of parameters and 1m  and 2m  are the vectors of exogenously 
determined explanatory variables, namely  21 0 1pr,A , p,w,c,S , ,k m  and 
 22 0 1 1pr ,A , p,w,c,S , ,k ,I  m , with 1k   and 1I  denoting the lagged values of capital 
and investment, respectively.2  T .  is an indicator function taking the value of one if the 
condition inside the parenthesis is met and zero otherwise. Since the shadow values of the 
quasi-fixed input kJ  are not observable, we assume that there exists a mapping between 
these shadow values and the lagged values of net farm income on a per acre basis.3 The 
upper and lower thresholds are represented by ukJ  and lkJ  respectively and  1 2 3e ,e ,e  
is the vector of independently and identically distributed errors.  
 The econometric methods used to estimate the system in (3) are described in 
Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000). Hansen’s (1999) proposal to estimate a single equation 
model using threshold techniques is generalized to our system of equations using 
sequential conditional iterated SUR in two stages, as in Serra and Goodwin (2003).  
                                                 
2 Lagged values of  k  and I  have been used to avoid endogeneity issues.  
3 Since Hansen (1999) does not provide a method to objectively choose among different specifications of 
the threshold variable, different alternatives were considered and we selected the one producing results 
more compatible with previous research and economic theory.  
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In the first stage a grid search is carried out to estimate the threshold parameters 
l
kJ  and ukJ . The lower threshold is searched over the minimum and median of the lagged 
net farm income, while the upper threshold is searched over the range that goes from the 
median to the maximum value of the lagged net farm income. The search is restricted to 
ensure an adequate number of observations in each regime. For a given pair  l uk kJ ,J , 
regression coefficients are estimated by SUR.4 From this estimation the logarithm of the 
determinant of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals   is derived as 
   l u l uk k k kˆS J ,J ln J ,J  , with  l uk kˆ J ,J  being a multivariate SUR estimate of 
 var   conditional on lkJ  and ukJ . 
 In the second stage of the estimation process, the SUR estimate of  l uk kJ ,J  is 
obtained by minimizing function  l uk kS J ,J , which is equivalent to maximizing a 
likelihood function    argmin
l u
k k
l u l u
k k k k
J ,J
ˆ ˆJ ,J S J ,J  (Hansen and Seo, 2002). To test for the 
significance of the differences in parameters across regimes, we use the likelihood ratio 
proposed by Hansen (1999) and Lo and Zivot (2001). Since this test does not follow a 
standard distribution, its value is compared against the critical values derived from the 
                                                 
4 The error variance-covariance matrix used in SUR estimation is specified as usual ( I , where I is the 
identity matrix) to allow for cross-equation correlation. The estimate of the cross-equation error covariance 
matrix is obtained by first fitting the model using ordinary least squares.   
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bootstrap procedure outlined in Hansen (1996). Confidence intervals for the threshold 
parameters are derived as in Hansen (1999).5 
 
 
3. Empirical Implementation 
 
The model is estimated using farm-level data for a sample of Kansas farms observed 
from 1997 to 2001 which corresponds to the implementation of the FAIR Act. Micro data 
are derived from the Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) database. 
Aggregate data are also used to define those variables unavailable at the farm-level. Since 
the KFMA database does not register input and output prices, national-level input and 
output price indices are taken from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides state-level marketing 
assistance loan rates and PFC payment rates. The Federal Reserve provides data on the 
federal funds rate.  
Our analysis concentrates on those farms specialized in production of the most 
relevant crops in Kansas, i.e., wheat, corn, grain sorghum and soybeans. In this regard, 
we only consider those farms whose sales of the four crops represent at least 80 per cent 
of total sales. We define a single output category ( y ) that aggregates the production of 
wheat, corn, grain sorghum and soybeans. To do so, national-level crop price indices and 
                                                 
5 The econometric theory concerning confidence intervals for threshold parameters has been developed by 
Hansen (1999) for a single equation model. Although our system of equations is estimated jointly for 
efficiency issues, only one equation is estimated with threshold effects.   
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farm-level income from each individual crop are aggregated using appropriate index 
number methods to form composite price and quantity indices. More specifically farm-
level Divisia price indices are built from these data which allow deriving farm-level 
quantity indices by dividing total income by the Divisia price index. Once the aggregate 
output price index is built, we define expected output prices at the farm level using the 
adaptive expectation hypothesis as suggested by Chavas and Holt (1990).  
The aggregate variable input includes pesticides and insecticides, fertilizer, seed, 
gas-fuel-oil and irrigation energy. National-level input price indices and farm-level 
expenditures on each input are aggregated using the same index methods as is the case of 
outputs. Capital aggregate price ( z ) and quantity ( k ) indices are built in the same fashion 
and include vehicles, machinery and buildings. The rental price for capital ( c ) is 
computed by assuming that the current asset price can be derived as a continuously 
discounted sum of all future rents on the depreciated asset (see Epstein and Denny, 1983; 
and Pietola and Myers, 2000). According to this assumption, the rental price of capital is 
computed as  c r z  , where c  is the rental price, r  is the interest rate corresponding 
to the annual federal funds interest rate and   is the farm-level capital depreciation rate.  
The Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. In its place, a 
single measure including all government payments received by each farm is available. 
We estimate farm-level PFC payments by approximating the acreage of the program 
crops (base acreage) and the base yield for each crop using farm-level data. The 
approximation uses the 1986-1988 average acreage and yield for each program crop and 
farm and allows to construct a balanced panel of 148 farms.  PFC payments per crop are 
computed by multiplying the base acreage, the base yield and the PFC payment rate by 
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0.85.6 PFC payments per crop are then added to get total direct payments per farm. This 
estimate is compared to actual government payments received by each farm. If estimated 
PFC payments exceed actual payments, the first measure is replaced by the second.  
Initial wealth 0A  is computed as the lagged value of a farm’s total assets 
(excluding the lagged capital stock already measured by 1k ). The variance of the output 
price is defined at the farm-level strictly following Chavas and Holt (1990), who propose 
a weighted sum of the squared deviations of past prices from their expected values. The 
value of the net farm income is computed as the value of farm production less operating 
expenses and depreciation. Its lagged value on a per acre basis is taken as the threshold 
variable. Summary statistics for the variables in the analysis are presented in table 1.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Some details pertaining to the empirical estimation are described here. Following 
Sckokai (2005) all prices, subsidies and initial wealth are normalized by the capital rental 
price in the interest of parsimony.  The variance of price is normalized by the square of 
the capital rental price. Since the capital rental price comprises the interest rate, r  is not 
included again as a single explanatory variable to avoid multicollinearity issues. A total 
of 57 county-level dummy variables are incorporated in the final estimation to account 
for unobserved regional differences in land quality, farm management skills, agricultural 
production techniques, climate, etc. The inclusion of these dummies involves 
implementing a restricted version of the fixed effects panel data technique, in which 
                                                 
6 In doing this, we follow the formula devised to calculate PFC (see Young and Shields, 1996). 
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farms are assumed to be heterogeneous across regions, while homogeneity within regions 
is assumed though only for the unobserved variables. An F test for the significance of 
these effects is computed for each regime.7   
 
Table 2 here 
 
The point estimates of the two thresholds and their asymptotic 95 per cent 
confidence intervals are reported in table 2. The distribution of threshold estimates might 
depend on the data and the bootstrap size may not have an accelerated rate of 
convergence (Hansen, 1999). This may explain the wider confidence intervals for the first 
threshold parameter. The lower threshold is 9.38 and the upper equals 91.54, thus 
corresponding to small and large lagged returns to unpaid labour, management and equity 
on a per acre basis.8 These thresholds separate firms into three different groups: those 
receiving low returns per acre (disinvestment regime), the ones with intermediate returns 
(no investment regime) and the group benefiting from the highest net farm income per 
acre (investment regime). The no investment regime concentrates 498 observations, while 
the disinvestment and investment regimes have 156 and 86 observations, respectively. 
The null hypothesis of no threshold against the alternative of two thresholds is rejected 
                                                 
7 As suggested by an anonymous referee, by extending Hansen’s (1997) econometric theory to the 
multivariate setting, inference on parameter estimates can be probably carried out as if the thresholds were 
a priori known. As a result, tests for fixed effects to address specification issues can be computed within 
each regime. 
8 The first and the second threshold correspond to the 21th and 88th percentiles of the distribution of kJ . 
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using the likelihood ratio test proposed by Hansen (1999).9 Fixed effects are found to be 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
The regression slope parameter estimates and their standard errors are presented 
in table 3.10 Allowing for two regime-dependent variables in the investment demand 
equation (lagged stock of capital and expected output price), the slope parameters of the 
lagged stock of capital take values ranging between -1 and 0. While this implies that 
capital adjusts to its long-run equilibrium, it is important to note that since these 
parameters are closer to 0 than to -1, our estimates are closer to non-stationarity than to 
stationarity.  These coefficients are all statistically significant and differ across regimes. 
As expected, the lowest value corresponds to the central (no investment) regime, while 
the highest values are registered in the extreme (investment and disinvestment) regimes. 
In analogy with Boetel et al. (2007), capital adjustment is found to be asymmetric and 
shows a faster adjustment in the investment than in the disinvestment regime. Expected 
output price coefficients in the investment demand equation are also greater in magnitude 
in the extreme regimes. While in the extreme regimes these parameters are statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level, the price coefficient in the no investment 
regime is only statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The non-threshold 
                                                 
9 The null of one threshold against two thresholds was also tested and rejected (with a p-value of 0.01). 
Finally the null of zero versus one threshold was also rejected (p-value = 0.05). 
10 In order to save space, we do not present regional dummy parameter estimates, which are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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estimations for output supply and variable input demand find that increases in the lagged 
capital stock and in the expected output prices result in increases in output supply and 
variable input demand. Increases in the lagged value of investment demand are also 
found to motivate higher levels of variable input use and output produced. 
Higher variable input prices are found to significantly reduce both output supply 
and input demand (table 3). The coefficients on the variance of output price have the 
expected negative sign and are statistically significant in the output supply and variable 
input demand equations. Hence, an increase in risk reduces production. The negative 
effects of risk may be related both to risk aversion and to the option value of waiting.11 
The coefficient on decoupled payments is of particular interest, since it is positive 
and statistically different from zero in all the three equations. As shown by Sckokai 
(2005), decoupled payments can impact production levels by altering farmers’ risk 
preferences and also through dynamic effects by stimulating investment demand. 
Focusing on the risk effects, consider initial wealth coefficient estimate which is positive 
and statistically significant in all three equations. Hence, an increase in wealth increases 
input use and output produced. The relevance of wealth in explaining production 
decisions is compatible with the relevance of risk attitudes in explaining production 
behaviour.12 It is widely accepted that an economic agent’s degree of risk aversion 
decreases with wealth (Sandmo, 1971; Hennessy, 1998). Hence, wealthier farmers, in 
being less risk averse, are likely to be more prone to expand their business size. Since 
                                                 
11 As noted by an anonymous referee, separating these two effects becomes very difficult in empirical 
analyses. 
12 The relationship between wealth and risk preferences should only be carefully established as we do not 
observe risk attitudes. 
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decoupled payments contribute to enhance wealth, they lead to increasing output supply 
and input demand. The second payment-type effects comprise the dynamic effects, which 
should be relevant because lump sum transfers not only motivate variable input use but 
also capital investments. This hypothesis is confirmed by the computed elasticities of 
output and inputs with respect to the policy instruments. 
We analyse the sensitivity of the decision variables with respect to decoupled 
payments and, for comparison purposes, to output prices to understand the workings of 
the output supply/input demand system and to better assess the impacts of policy reform. 
As in Boetel et al. (2007), ours is a dynamic recursive system. The elasticities are derived 
at the data means for all three regimes for different lengths of run. The base-scenario 
solves for the system of equations by forcing the solution to be in each regime 
alternatively and holding the explanatory variables at their mean levels. Once we have the 
regime-dependent solution, we increase decoupled payments by 5 per cent and the 
solution to the system is re-computed. A comparison of the quantities in the base scenario 
with those derived after the shock allows computing the elasticities for different time 
periods. The same operation is repeated to assess the impacts of a shock in output prices. 
Results for the impacts of an output price increase and of a decoupled payment increase 
are presented in tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
Tables 4 and 5  here 
 
Empirical results show that both short-run and long-run price and payment 
elasticities are inelastic. Expected price elasticities are positive and decline as we move 
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from the extreme regimes towards the central regime. With regards to the extreme 
regimes, prices are found to be more influential in good rather than in bad economic 
scenarios. These results are compatible with the change in expected price parameter 
estimates across regimes: while price coefficients in the extreme regimes are highly 
significant and larger than in the central regime, output price in the central regime is not 
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level (although it is significant at the 10 per cent 
level).  
Payment elasticities tell a different story, since the influence of government 
support is generally more relevant in difficult economic situations than in more 
prosperous times (table 5). Decoupled payments exert a positive influence on investment 
demand. However, the impact of these payments declines as the shadow price of capital 
increases and thus as we move from the disinvestment to the investment regimes. This 
pattern is especially clear in the intermediate and in the long-run. The impact of 
decoupled payments on output supply and input demand follows a similar path. This 
result is important and shows that the main role of subsidies is to stimulate production 
during difficult times. 
When comparing the relative strength of price and payment elasticities, we find 
that price is the most powerful economic incentive in favorable economic situations, 
while payments can be more influential during economic difficulties. In the disinvestment 
regime, for example, while prices have a stronger impact than PFC payments on 
investment demand, variable input use increases more as a result of government support. 
Hence, it is likely that in the disinvestment regime, decoupled payments are mainly 
devoted to increase output by means of increasing variable input use. In the no 
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investment regime where output prices are only statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level, PFC payments are more relevant than prices in stimulating output supply and input 
demand. 
The derived payment impacts are higher than the ones reported by previous 
analyses that have ignored the dynamic investment response, as well as the irregularities 
in the capital stock adjustment function (see Serra et al., 2006; Moro and Sckokai, 1999). 
Both payment and price elasticities increase over time as a result of the dynamic effects. 
Price elasticities experience considerable increases within the ten-year period studied 
(investment demand elasticities increase between 300 and 350 per cent, while output 
supply and variable input demand elasticities experience increases between 50 and 200 
per cent). Investment demand payment elasticities experience similar increases as the 
corresponding price elasticities. Output and variable input payment elasticities experience 
smaller increases, ranging from 40 to 80 per cent. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper assesses the impacts of decoupled government transfers on production 
decisions of a sample of Kansas farms observed from 1997 to 2001. Our empirical 
analysis is based upon a reduced-form application of the dual model of investment under 
uncertainty developed by Sckokai (2005) which is extended to a consideration of 
irregularities in the capital stock adjustment cost function. Following Boetel et al. (2007), 
we adopt the threshold estimation procedure proposed by Hansen (1999).  
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We allow the slope coefficient of the lagged capital stock in the investment 
demand equation to switch among investment regimes, thus permitting the adjustment 
speed to long run equilibrium to vary by regime. In addition, extending the work by 
Boetel et al. (2007), we also consider asymmetry in immediate short run responses by 
allowing the expected output price coefficient in the investment demand equation to 
change among regimes.  
 The econometric results support the existence of three different regimes 
characterised by different economic behaviour. A first group includes firms receiving a 
low per acre return to unpaid labour, management and equity (disinvestment regime), 
firms receiving an intermediate income belong to the second group (no investment 
regime), while the third group is composed by firms receiving the highest income 
(investment regime). Firms in the no investment regime have the slowest capital 
adjustments, while those in the disinvestment and investment regimes adjust capital stock 
at a quicker rate.  
In order to determine the impacts of decoupled payments on production decisions, 
we compute the elasticities of the decision variables with respect to these payments and, 
for comparison purposes, with respect to output prices. Results suggest that in our 
dynamic setting price elasticities are positive and decline as we move from the extreme 
towards the central regimes. Payment elasticities tell a different story: the influence of 
government support is generally more important in difficult economic situations than in 
more prosperous times. This result is important and shows that the main role of subsidies 
is to stimulate production during difficult situations. 
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When comparing the relative strength of price and payment elasticities, we find 
that price is the most powerful economic incentive in favorable economic situations, 
while payments can be more influential during economic difficulties. It is also 
noteworthy that the derived payment impacts are higher than the ones reported by 
previous analyses that have ignored the dynamic investment response, as well as the 
irregularities in the capital stock adjustment function. Both payment and price elasticities 
increase over time since the dynamics of the stock of capital cause the influence of both 
prices and subsidies to grow over time. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis (N=740) 
Variable 
 
 Estimate  
(standard deviation) 
1k   Lagged capital stock (index) 188,391.330 
(150,011.440) 
r   Interest rate 0.052 
(0.008) 
p   Expected output price (index) 1.119 
(0.247) 
S   PFC payments (constant 1998 USD) 15,179.650 
(9,239.380) 
w   Variable input price (index) 1.050 
(0.054) 
c  Capital rental price (index) 0.167 
(0.039) 
0A   Initial wealth (constant 1998 USD) 543,379.870 
(471,451.770) 
2
p   Variance of output price 0.059 
(0.039) 
k  Time derivative of capital (index) 4,336.130 
(35,532.970) 
y  Output quantity (index) 165,155.240 
(143,883,760) 
x  Variable input quantity (index) 70,056.550 
(61,850.000) 
kJ  Assets’ shadow price (constant 1998 
USD per acre) 
41.445 
(46.310) 
Note: Divisia indices are computed using 1998 as the base year. Quantity indices are 
obtained by dividing income (or expenditures) by the corresponding price index. 
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Table 2. Threshold estimates for the estimated system and specification tests      
Threshold Estimate 95 per cent confidence intervals 
Lower 9.380 -7.620 – 15.380 
Upper 91.545 83.545 – 95.545 
  
Specification Tests  Test value (p value) 
LR test  15.251 (0.019) 
F test for fixed effects Disinvestment regime 
No investment regime 
Investment regime 
1.22 (0.080) 
3.690 (0.000) 
2.070 (0.000) 
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Table 3. Parameter estimates for the estimated system      
Variable Investment demand Output supply Variable input 
demand 
 Disinvestment 
regime 
N=156 
No 
investment 
regime 
N=498 
Investment 
regime 
N=86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1k   -0.120**
(0.020)
-0.066**
(0.015)
-0.148**
(0.026)
0.098** 
(0.005) 
0.030** 
(0.002)
p  12,119.377**
(6,326.576)
8,732.635*
(5,132.204)
17,321.187**
(6,297.730)
4,378.452** 
(1,856.957) 
2,450.672** 
(859.568)
w   -16,635.920** 
(5,829.503) 
-9,813.390** 
(2,156.964) 
-4,790.567** 
(998.278)
2 p   -1,678.029 
(3,261.260) 
-2,049.679* 
(1,215.775) 
-1,600.813** 
(562.811)
* (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) per cent significance level. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. 
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Table 3. Parameter estimates for the estimated system (continued)      
Variable Investment demand Output supply Variable input demand 
S   0.766** 
(0.211) 
0.371** 
(0.079) 
0.248** 
(0.037) 
0A   0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
1I   0.025* 
(0.014) 
0.026** 
(0.006) 
R-squared 0.20 0.78 0.99 
* (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) per cent significance level. Values in parenthesis are standard errors. 
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Table 4. Elasticities under the different investment regimes: Responses (in  per cent) to a permanent 5 per cent output price increase 
Period Investment demand Output supply Input demand 
 Disinvestment 
regime 
No 
investment 
regime 
Investment 
regime 
Disinvestment 
regime 
No 
investment 
regime 
Investment 
regime 
Disinvestment 
regime 
No 
investment 
regime 
Investment 
regime 
1st 0.735 
 
0.513 
 
1.024 
 
1.283 
 
1.158 
 
1.418 
 
1.637 
 
1.489 
 
1.787 
 
5th  1.737 
 
1.229 
 
2.267 
 
2.029 
 
1.655 
 
2.371 
 
2.174 
 
1.849 
 
2.455 
 
10th 2.440 
 
1.781 
 
3.010 
 
2.553 
 
2.056 
 
2.943 
 
2.552 
 
2.149 
 
2.859 
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Table 5. Elasticities under the different investment regimes: Responses (in per cent) to a permanent 5 per cent decoupled payments 
increase 
Period Investment demand Output supply Input demand 
 Disinvestment 
regime 
No 
investment 
regime 
Investment 
regime 
Disinvestment 
regime 
No 
investment 
regime 
Investment 
regime 
Disinvestment 
regime 
No 
investment 
regime 
Investment 
regime 
1st 0.615 
 
0.596 
 
0.599 
 
1.343 
 
1.308 
 
1.337 
 
2.003 
 
1.944 
 
1.692 
 
5th  1.452 
 
1.425 
 
1.326 
 
1.966 
 
1.887 
 
1.887 
 
2.450 
 
2.351 
 
2.373 
 
10th  2.039 
 
2.065 
 
1.760 
 
2.404 
 
2.353 
 
2.217 
 
2.764 
 
2.689 
 
2.604 
 
  
